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AND THE TWO SHALL BECOME AS ONE...
UNTIL THE LAWYERS ARE DONE
TERESA STANTON COLLETT*

From the first day of practice the lawyer who specializes in
estate planning will be dealing with families. Drafting wills or
trusts for married couples is a common task. The documents
produced will affect all members of the clients' immediate family. This "family" aspect of estate planning practice distinguishes it from the other types of transactional practice, while
the harmonious nature of most clients' families sets it apart
from litigation practice. Yet estate planners are governed by
the same ethical or disciplinary rules that limit the conduct of
lawyers specializing in corporate representation or trial work.
Unfortunately the unique nature of the estate planning practice
is ill-served by observing the principles contained in the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.'
This article focuses upon the current controversy concerning the appropriate course of conduct by an attorney asked to
represent both spouses in planning their estates. Problems
encountered in applying the Model Rules will be examined as
well as the competing models for resolving those problems.
Four models of representation have been proposed in the literature: (1) lawyer for the family;2 (2) separate representation by
separate lawyers;' (3) separate simultaneous representation by
the same lawyer;4 and (4) joint representation by the same law*
Associate Professor of Law at South Texas College of Law. The
author wishes to thank Professor Jeffrey Pennell for his thorough review of
earlier drafts of this article, as well as Professors Thomas Shaffer, John
Bauman, and Shelby Moore for their insightful comments insuring increased
clarity of expression.
1. As of Fall 1992, all or a significant portion of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct had been adopted in more than 35 states and the
District of Columbia. STEPHEN GILLERS & Roy SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF
LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS at X (1993). While the Rules have been

modified in several of these jurisdictions, the basic tenets contained in the

Model Rules reflect the applicable rules in a majority of states.

GEOFFREY C.
HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING" A HANDBOOK ON
THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § AP4:101 (1990).

2.
3.
4.

See infra note 93.
See infra note 94.
See infra note 95.
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yer.' This article rejects the model of separate simultaneous
representation of both spouses by the same lawyer, questions
the viability of the model of lawyer for the family as a professional norm, and concludes that the models of separate representation of an individual spouse or joint representation of
both spouses are consistent with the current professional
ethos.
ESTATE PLANNING FOR COUPLES UNDER THE MODEL RULES

Estate planning for married couples routinely raises issues6
addressed by the Model Rules regarding conflicts of interest,
confidentiality, 7 and independence of the lawyer's judgment.8
The Model Rules view transactional practice as primarily assisting individual clients in structuring their affairs to maximize
individual benefit through conformity with legal requirements. 9
To the extent that the client's objectives are neither fraudulent
nor criminal,' ° ethical evaluation of the lawyer's conduct is
based primarily on whether the lawyer maximized the legal
benefits to the client."1
Currently, the rules appear to classify estate planning for
married couples as simultaneous representation of two individuals. 2 Thus the initial decision concerning whether such representation is proper is controlled by Rule 1.7:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another
client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the
relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited
5. See infra note 96.
6. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, and
1,10 (1991) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].

7.
8.
9.

Id. Rule 1.6.
Id. Rule 2.1.
Id. pmbl; see also Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role:

A Defense, A Problem, And Some Possibilities, 4 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613 (1986).
10. MODEL RULES, supra note 6, Rule 1.2(d) cmt. 6.
11. Cf Hodges v. Carter, 80 S.E.2d 144 (N.C. 1954) (suit against
attorney for malpractice held that attorneys bind themselves to "do whatever
may be necessary in order to bring the matters to a successful conclusion, to

the best of their knowledge and ability"); see also Day v. Rosenthal, 217 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986).
12. MODEL RULES, supra note 6, Rule 1.7 cmt. 13.
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by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client
or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer :reasonably believes the
representation will not be adversely
affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is
undertaken, the consultation shall
include explanation of the implications of the common representation
and the advantages, and risks
involved.
Representation of both husband and wife ,for purposes of
estate planning rarely involves any matters that are directly
adverse at the outset of the representation, although such
adversity may develop later during representation." Thus in
most cases either no rule precludes representation or the applicable standard for evaluating the attorney's conduct in representing spouses planning their estates is Rule 1.7(b) pertaining
to representation subject to material limitations due to the lawyer's responsibilities to others.
In the context of a harmonious couple seeking joint representation, attempts to fit the relationship into the confines of
Rule 1.7 or determine whether subsection (a) or (b) applies
may prove to be searching for a distinction that ultimately
makes no difference. Either the attorney is free to accept representation of both clients without any limitation, or informed
consent by the clients to any potential conflicts will allow representation to be undertaken. In order for the consent to be
effective under either 1.7(a) or (b), the lawyer must explain the
implications of the common representation and describe both
the advantages and risks inherent in sharing counsel.' 4 It is
further incumbent upon the lawyer to discuss the impact that
common representation will have on the attorney-client privilege,' 5 as well as whether future confidences by one spouse will
13.
14.

See hypothetical fact situation infra pp. 105-06.
MODEL RULES, supra note 6, Rule 1.7 cmt. 5; see also RESTATEMENT

LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

OF

§ 202 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1991) [hereinafter

Some commentators indicate that the
language of the Rule elaborating on what constitutes "informed consent"
under 1.7(b)(2) does not define the minimum conduct under 1.7(a)(2). See
HAZARD & HODES, supra note 1, § 1.7:305.
RESTATEMENT GOVERNING LAWYERS].

15.

See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS

§ 7.3.1 (1986);
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be disclosed automatically to the other spouse.' 6 Such disclosure is permissible under the rule governing confidentiality
only with client consent. 17
Clients must also understand that any representation can
only be successful to the extent that clients are candid about
their testamentary desires. Unfortunately, some clients may be
less candid in the presence of their spouses."8 On this basis,
some authorities argue that clients are best served by separate
representation through separate lawyers,' 9 or separate simultaneous representation by a single lawyer. 20 The advantages and
disadvantages of each of these models are explored in this article, after examining the limitations of the current Model Rules
of Professional Conduct.
see also RESTATEMENT OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 125 (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1989).
16. See WOLFRAM, supra note 15, § 6.4.8.
17. MODEL RULES, supra note 6, Rule 1.6(a) provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation
of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation, and except as stated in Paragraphs (b) and (c).
Paragraphs (b) (permissive disclosure to prevent criminal act likely to result
in imminent death or substantial bodily harm) and (c) (permissive disclosure
to establish claim or defense by attorney related to representation) do not
apply to these facts.
18. Evelyn Betts Thomason, How Estate Planners Can Cope With the
Increasing Risk of Malpractice Claims, 12 EST. PLAN. 130, 134 (1985).
19. See Jackson M. Bruce, Ethics in Estate Planning and Estate
Administration, 15 PROB. NOTES 118, 120 (1989); Committee on Significant
New Developments in Probate and Trust Law Practice, Developments Regarding
the ProfessionalResponsibility of the Estate Planning Lawyer: The Effect of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1, 11 (1987)
[hereinafter Committee Report]; cf. Klein v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509
(Ct. App. 1977) (issue determined by the court involved to what extent an
attorney may represent both a husband and wife in a noncontested
dissolution proceeding where written consent of both had been filed with the
court. The court held that where an actual, present, and existing conflict may
exist between the parties, though an informed consent had been obtained, it
could not sanction dual representation where questions of fact remained
concerning whether consent was given based on knowledge obtained by full
disclosure by the attorney.).
20. See Jeffrey Pennell, Professional Responsibility: Reforms Are Needed to
Accommodate Estate Planningand Family Counselling, 1991 MIAMI INST. EST. PLAN.
18-3, 18-29; cf. In re Roberts, 75 B.R. 402 (D. Utah 1987) (law firm's
simultaneous representation of a corporation and its principals in a separate
Chapter 11 proceeding did not give rise to a per se conflict of interest or
appearance of impropriety as the conflicts were more theoretical than actual).
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Application of the present rules will be illustrated by considering the proper course of conduct to be undertaken by
Lawyer in the following hypothetical situation:
Lawyer has represented John Smith for many years. At
64, John has lived what many perceive to be a remarkably
successful life. He has been married to Wanda, his first
and only wife, for 42 years, has three children who are
each happily married and successful in their careers, and
has built a business which most recently was valued at $5
million. From the first time he came to Lawyer and asked
Lawyer's help incorporating his small retail store, until
recently when Lawyer helped him obtain a favorable private letter ruling from the IRS, Lawyer has always been
impressed with John's business acumen and devotion to
principles. On a more personal level, Lawyer has
admired John's devotion to family and community. In
1990, after meeting with John and Wanda together, Lawyer drafted both John and Wanda's wills containing mirror-image provisions; the surviving spouse was to receive
everything outright. Upon the death of the surviving
spouse, the children were to receive all remaining assets
in equal shares. Virtually all of John and Wanda's assets
were held in John's name. Lawyer recommended transferring some assets to Wanda to maximize the potential
estate tax savings, but John and Wanda declined to make
any transfers. Lawyer also recommended an annual gift
giving program, which John and Wanda declined to
implement.
Yesterday Lawyer met with John, who told Lawyer
that he wanted help with some estate planning. John
explained to Lawyer that he had reevaluated his priorities
and his religious faith. He wants to make a $100,000 gift
to the ministry of a particular television evangelist. He
seeks Lawyer's advice because the people at the ministry
indicate that they have not yet received approval from the
IRS for their application to be recognized as a taxexempt organization. While he still wants to make the
gift, even if it is taxable, John is willing to wait a short
period if necessary to make the gift tax-free.
In addition to the gift of $100,000, John wants to
revise his will. He wants to leave his entire estate in trust
for the benefit of his wife during her lifetime. Upon her
death he wants all assets of the trust to be distributed
unconditionally to the ministry of the television evangelist. Over the years Lawyer has been aware that John was
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fairly active as a member of St. Luke's Episcopal Church.
He made substantial contributions to its larger fund-raising efforts.
John was reluctant to discuss Wanda's reaction to
what he called "his new found faith" although he did
indicate that she was not aware of his plans to give
$100,000 to the ministry. In response to Lawyer's question, John said that he had not discussed changing his
will or making the gift with anyone but Lawyer, nor did
he intend to.
Lawyer ended the meeting by telling John that it
would take a couple of weeks to find out whether
approval of the ministry's application for tax-exempt status was likely. Lawyer promised to call John as soon as
Lawyer knew anything.
The first question to be answered both under the Model
Rules and in any ethical analysis is: where should the lawyer's
loyalty lie?
WHAT Is LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH JOHN AND WANDA?

The facts state that Lawyer "has represented John Smith
for many years." Clearly Lawyer has an attorney-client relationship with John. The facts also indicate that Lawyer met
with and accepted direction from Wanda in the 1990 drafting
of her will. Whether or not any formal agreement or contract
exists, these facts reveal that an attorney-client relationship was
established with Wanda. 2 '
Establishing that the attorney-client relationship existed
between Lawyer, John, and Wanda is easier than characterizing
the nature of the relationship. 22 There are three possible char21. See Buntrock v. Buntrock, 419 So. 2d 402 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(affirming denial of foreign attorneys' admission as co-counsel to husband in
a divorce case where foreign attorneys had prepared will for wife in a prior
year. The court rejected claim that the preparation of the wife's will was
incidental to the representation of the husband, thus making the wife merely
a third party beneficiary of his representation); cf. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284, 1301 (N.D. Ill. 1978) ("Recognizing
the absence of express manifestation, the oil companies fall back on the
accepted principle that the relation of attorney and client may be implied
from the conduct of the parties. In the typical case, such conduct includes the
preparation of a legally-binding document like a contract or a will ....
(citation ommitted).
22. Compare Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d
1311 (7th Cir. 1978) (Counsel for a trade association was asked to represent a
party in litigation against some of the association's members. The members
moved for disqualification. The court expressly declined to make any
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acterizations under these facts. The 1990 conduct may indicate
that Lawyer represented John and Wanda as two unrelated clients who consented to the disclosure of confidences to each
other.23 Alternatively, John and Wanda could be considered
two individuals seeking counsel jointly. 24 The third interpretation of these facts would identify John and Wanda as one family
seeking Lawyer's assistance, with the "family" being treated as
an independent entity for purposes of representation. 25 No
existing Model Rule or professional standard provides definitive guidance on the proper choice among these alternatives
when the clients have not clearly stated their desires concerning the form of representation. 2 6 A majority of practitioners
would classify Lawyer's representation of John and Wanda as
joint representation 2 7 since recommendations were given to
both of them, and Lawyer accepted direction from both John
and Wanda.
CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS BETWEEN PRESENT CLIENTS

Another question left unanswered in the hypothetical facts
is whether Wanda is a current client of Lawyer. The answer to
this question is dependent upon facts which are not provided
concerning their relationship. Yet proper classification of
Wanda as a former or present client determines which Model
Rule controls Lawyer's actions.
generalized statement that counsel for a trade association represents every
member of the association, but disqualified the law firm on the narrower
ground that the association members who were sued had previously
submitted confidential information to the firm in connection with legislative
activities on behalf of the association).
23. Under this characterization Lawyer would be representing each
spouse separately and simultaneously with consent to disclosure of
confidences. The consent to disclosure of confidences distinguishes Lawyer's
representation from the model of separate simultaneous representation
discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 152-194.
24. Under this characterization Lawyer would be representing the
couple jointly. See infra text accompanying notes 195-207.
25. Under this characterization Lawyer would be representing the
family. See infra text accompanying notes 97-124.
26. MODEL RULES, supra note 6, Rule 1.7 cmt. 13 concludes with the
admonition, "[t]he lawyer should make clear the relationship to the parties
involved." The absence of a "default rule" defining the relationship of the
parties absent an agreement is one of the major weaknesses of the Model
Rules.
27. See John C. Williams, The Case of the Unwanted Will, Comments from
John C. Williams, 65 A.B.A.J. 484, 486 (1979); cf. Clare H. Springs, Advice on
Representing Both Husband and Wife, 130 TR. & EST. 21, 48 (1991).
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Rule 1.7 deals with conflicts of interests which arise
between present clients. In order for this rule to control Lawyer's conduct, Wanda must be a present client. The facts do
not indicate that Lawyer has performed any additional legal
services for Wanda since 1990. However the passage of three
years may not be sufficient to assume that the attorney-client
relationship that existed in 1990 has terminated, 28 particularly
if the form of the representation suggested a continuing relationship with the "family" as a separate entity.2 9 Comment 3 to
Rule 1.3 recognizes the difficulty in determining when representation has ceased, absent a formal letter of termination of
representation.3 ° In the hypothetical case, Lawyer continues to
actively represent Wanda's husband, and it may be reasonable
for Wanda to believe that Lawyer continues to be "her" lawyer
as well. 3 ' If Wanda is a current client of Lawyer, Rule 1.7
28. See Manoir-Electroalloys Corp. v. Amalloy Corp., 711 F. Supp. 188
(D.N.J. 1989). The court ruled that a client was a current client even though
the law firm was not actively providing legal services and had not done so for
over four years. Finding the relationship to be "sufficiently continuous," the
court concluded that "the mere fortuity that [the client] did not require more
extensive or frequent services than he did cannot be the escape hatch [the law
firm] would have it to be." Id. at 194. But see Artromick Int'l, Inc. v. Drustar,
Inc., 134 F.R.D. 226 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (holding that it was unreasonable to
continue to demand an attorney's undivided loyalty for an indefinite period
of time when a final bill had been submitted and new business was given to a
new attorney).
29. Lawyer continued to represent John actively. Since John is a
member of the family, if Lawyer represents the family, the burden of proof
would be upon Lawyer to establish that representation of the family had
terminated and any subsequent representation was limited to John's
individual interests.

See MODEL RULES, supra note 6, Rule 1.3 cmt. 3

reproduced in note 30 infra. Wanda could convincingly argue that
representation of the family continued through the representation of its
member.
30. MODEL RULES, supra note 6, Rule 1.3 cmt. 3 provides:
Unless the relationship is terminated as provided in Rule 1.16, a
lawyer should carry through to conclusion all matters undertaken
for a client. If a lawyer's employment is limited to a specific matter,
the relationship terminates when the matter has been resolved. If a
lawyer has served a client over a substantial period [of time] in a
variety of matters, the client sometimes may assume that the lawyer
will continue to serve on a continuing basis unless the lawyer gives
notice of withdrawal. Doubt about whether a client-lawyer
relationship still exists should be clarified by the lawyer, preferably
in writing, so that the client will not mistakenly suppose the lawyer is
looking after the client's affairs when the lawyer has ceased to do so.
31. Togstad v. Vesley, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn.
1980) supports the proposition that whether representation exists is
dependent upon reasonable belief of client.
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would be the controlling rule in determining whether Lawyer
can assist John in the proposed gift and alteration of his will.
Rule 1.7(a) requires the consent of both clients to dual
representation if such representation will be directly adverse to
the interest of either client. 2 The facts do not evidence direct
adverseness when dual representation began. In 1990 when
representation of Wanda was initially undertaken, the interests
of John and Wanda appear to have been compatible." This
compatibility is ultimately evidenced by the signing of mutual
wills containing mirror-image provisions. It is only during the
recent meeting with John that any adverseness of their interests
is suggested by the facts. If adverseness in fact exists, Rule
1.7(a) requires the lawyer obtain informed consent from both
clients to continue representation 3 4 or withdraw.3 5 One way to
avoid the strictures of the Rule would be to argue that no
adverseness exists. Wanda has no legally protected interest or
right to receive the benefits provided underJohn's 1990 will,3 6
and so the proposed modification of John's will can not be
directly adverse to any legal interest. If she survives John, the
law protects her from the effects of disinheritance through the
state's forced heir statutes,3 7 a system of community property,3 8 or dower.39 This interest is unaffected by the proposed
testamentary change. 40 Also, since all the property is in her
husband's name, absent some statute or case law to the contrary, she has no legal basis to object to the gift of $100,000. 4 ,
32.

MODEL RULES,

supra note 6, Rule 1.7(a)(2).

supra note 14, § 211 cmt. c;
see also id. § 201.
34. Id. § 202 cmt. d.
35. MODEL RULES, supra note 6, Rule 1.7 cmt. 2; see also id. Rule 1.16.
36. "The expectancy that one will inherit by intestacy or under a will
from a person now living is not property; it is not land, chattel or chose in
action, but rather the hope of owning such in the future." PAUL HASKELL,
PREFACE TO WILLS, TRUSTS AND ADMINISTRATION 80 (1987).
37. See THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 32,
(2d ed. 1953); WILLIAM J. BOWE ET AL., PAGE ON WILLS § 3.13 (4th ed. 1960)
("Forced Heirs Defined. Those persons whom the testator or donor cannot
deprive of the portion of his estate reserved for them by law, except on cases
where he has a just cause to disinherit them [e.g., person's spouse].").
38. HASKELL, supra note 36, at 149.
39. Id. at 132.
33. See

40.

other

RESTATEMENT GOVERNING LAWYERS,

Compare id. at 140. For a fascinating comparison with the laws of

times

and

other

nations,

TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW

41.

see

MARY

ANN

GLENDON,

THE

(1989), particularly 238-51.

SeeJohnson v. LaGrange, 365 N.E.2d 1056 (Ill. App. 1977). For full

discussion see Elias Clark, The Recapture of Testamentary Substitutes to Preserve the

Spouse's Elective Share: An Appraisal of Recent Statutory Reforms, 2 CONN. L. REV.
513 (1970). Reasonable unilateral gifts of community property are also
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Under this line of analysis none of John's proposed actions are
directly adverse to any legal right that Wanda has and the representation may be permissible.
Yet this "non-adversity" argument may fail for two reasons. First, Wanda may have a legally enforceable interest if
the execution of the 1990 mutual wills containing mirror-image
provisions evidences a contract to make a will.4" The courts are
careful "to distinguish between the mere agreement to make a
will and one not to revoke the same."143 Even if additional facts
support the conclusion that the 1990 mutual wills were executed pursuant to a contract to make a will and not revoke it,
there is limited authority that suggests that such an agreement
would not be enforceable by Wanda since she does not hold
title to any of the couple's assets. "The great inequality of consideration moving from the two makers" would defeat any
claim based on such a contract.4 4 However, the majority of
courts have disregarded any disparity in value of assets owned
of considby each party to the contract in considering the issue
45
eration to support a contract not to revoke a will.
Even if the facts do not support a determination that John
and Wanda have a contract making their individual wills irrevocable, Wanda may have an independent interest in loyal representation by her lawyer. In Hotz v. Minyard,46 the court
recognized a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against a lawyer
who told a client that a superseded will was her father's current
will. The attorney had separately represented both the father
and the daughter for over twenty years. The superseded will
provided for equal division of the father's property between his
son and a trust for the daughter. The same day the superseded
will was executed, the father returned to the attorney's office
permitted in the majority of community property jurisdictions. See Givens v.
Girard Life Ins. Co., 480 S.W.2d 421, 425 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1972).
42. See ATKINSON, supra note 37, § 49 ("Frequently joint or mutual wills
are made in pursuance of an agreement or compact not to revoke them."); see
also BOWE ET AL., supra note 37, § 10.48 ("Direct evidence of the contract [to

make a will] including evidence of an oral agreement, supplemented by the
execution of a will in accordance with such an agreement may be sufficient to
establish a contract."). See generally Annotation, Establishment and Effect, After
Death of One of the Makers ofJoint, Mutual or Reciprocal will, of Agreement Not to
Revoke W4ill, 17 A.L.R. 4th 167 (1982); W.S. Anderson, Annotation, Joint,
Mutual and Reciprocal Wills, 169 A.L.R. 9 (1947).
43. ATKINSON, supra note 37, § 49.
44. Levis v. Hammond, 100 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Iowa 1960). But see In re
Chapman's Estate, 239 N.W.2d 869 (Iowa 1976).
45. WILLIAM M. McGOVERN,JR. ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 390

(1988).
46.

403 S.E.2d 634 (S.C. 1991).
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and executed a second will diminishing the gift to the daughter.
The father specifically instructed the lawyer not to disclose the
existence of the second will to his daughter. The daughter subsequently requested a copy of the will her father had signed on
the morning of October 24, 1984. At the father's direction, "or
at least with his express permission," the attorney showed the
daughter the first will and discussed it with her in detail.4 7
Eventually the father died, the daughter discovered the perfidy
and sued the lawyer. 48
Nothing in the hypothetical facts concerning John and
Wanda approaches the level of active misrepresentation undertaken by the lawyer in the Hotz case. However, the court
emphasized the relationship between the lawyer and daughter,
opining:
Although Dobson represented Mr. Minyard and not Judy
regarding her father's will, Dobson did have an ongoing
attorney/client relationship with Judy and there is evidence she had 'a special confidence' in him. While Dobson had no duty to disclose the existence of the second
will against his client's (Mr. Minyard's) wishes, he owed
Judy the duty to deal with her in good faith and not
actively misrepresent the first will.4 9
It is not difficult to imagine a scenario where Lawyer is faced
with the same choice that the lawyer in Hotz faced if Lawyer
represents John and Wanda separately. If John utilizes Lawyer's services to change his will, upon a proper inquiry by
Wanda, Lawyer must either (1) reveal the fact that John
changed his will, ignoring John's implied direction that the
changes be kept confidential, 50 thereby breaching the duty to
John to maintain client confidences; 5 ' (2) misrepresent the true
state of John's testamentary plan, thus breaching the fiduciary
47.

Id. at 636.

48.
49.

Id.
Id. at 637.

50. See supra p. 106. "In response to Lawyer's question, John said that
he had not discussed changing his will or making the gift to anyone but
Lawyer, nor did he intend to."
51. MODEL RULES, supra note 6, Rule 1.6.
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duty owed to Wanda;5 2 or (3) decline to answer, effectively
'5 3
"waiving the red flag" while not "blowing the whistle."
The Hotz decision seems to limit attorneys engaged in separate representation to the third option only, rejecting any
affirmative duty to disclose confidential information that is detrimental to another client.5 4 Implicit in the Hotz opinion is a
determination that the duty to maintain the confidences of the
father was superior to the duty to give information to the
daughter.55 Only when the lawyer made affirmative misrepresentations to the daughter did he breach the duty of fair dealing he owed to her.5 6
This analysis disregards the growing body of case law
requiring lawyers to volunteer information under certain circumstances. 5 7 Informing the daughter of the true status of the
52.

Civil liability for the tort of fraud or deceit can attach when a lawyer

misrepresents factual information to a client. See RONALD E. MALLEN &
JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 8.8 (3d ed. 1989); see also Colorado

v. Blanck, 713 P.2d 832 (Colo. 1985) (counsel disbarred in a disciplinary
proceeding resulting from his misrepresentation to an unidentified couple
that a dissolution of marriage had been granted. Counsel had falsified a
decree issued to another couple and presented it to his clients); In re Barry,
447 A.2d 923 (NJ. 1982) (attorney fabricated an ongoing proceeding to a
client when no suit had even been filed. Attorney went so far as to have the
client travel to the courthouse on two occasions to attend trial proceedings
which were purely fictitious).
The duty of truthfulness to clients can be inferred from several
provisions contained in the Model Rules. MODEL RULES, supra note 6, Rule
1.4 requires the lawyer "explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary
to permit the client to make informed decisions." MODEL RULES, supra note
6, Rule 2.1 requires that a lawyer render "candid advice."
53. See generally Ronald D. Rotunda, The Notice of Withdrawal and the New
Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Blowing the Whistle and Waiving the Red Flag,
63 OR. L. REV. 455 (1984).
54. This result is consistent with one interpretation of the law of agency
as reflected in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1957) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY]:

Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to use
reasonable efforts to give his principal information which is relevant
to affairs entrusted to him and which, as the agent has notice, the
principal would desire to have and which can be communicated
without violating a superior duty to a third person.
55. If Dobson had represented only Mr. Hotz, or if the representation
had been joint from the outset, Dobson would have no conflicting duties. In
the first case, Dobson's duties run only to Mr. Hotz. In the second case, the
duty of maintaining confidences between the two clients would have been
waived, leaving only the duty to give information. See infra text accompanying
notes 195-207.
56. 403 S.E.2d at 637.
57. See Nebraska State Bar v. Addison, 412 N.W.2d 855 (Neb. 1987)
(lawyer disciplined for failing to voluntarily disclose existance of insurance
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father's will would not have limited his ability to achieve his
legitimate goal - unequal distribution of his estate." Maintaining the confidences of the father did limit the ability of the
daughter to make informed decisions concerning her future
course of conduct.5 9 Balancing the potential injury to each
party, it seems that where both parties are present clients of the
lawyer and there is no express agreement on this issue, the
duty to give information necessary for one client to exercise his
or her legal rights ought to trump the duty to maintain confidences, at least where disclosure would create no legal barrier
to the exercise of legal rights by the other client.60 Under this
policies in negotiations concerning payment of hospital bill). See generally
Gary Tobias Lowenthal, The Bar's Failure to Require Truthful Bargaining by
Lawyers, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411 (1988).
58. It would have eliminated his ability to mislead his daughter
concerning the contents of his will, but in the context of the Hotz case this
interest of the father does not weigh very heavily. However, it is possible to
posit a different set of facts where the father's desire for informational privacy
would seem more compelling. For example, a lawyer assisting both a parent
and child with their individual estate plans might find it more desirable to
maintain the parent's secret that he or she is terminally ill than to disclose this
information to the child over the parent's objection, even if the size of the
parent's estate is sufficiently large that the child should modify his or her plan
to accommodate the increase in assets which Lawyer knows will occur sooner
than the child anticipates.
59. The daughter was induced to abandon her plans to file a lawsuit
concerning her brother's management of the family business in exchange for
reinstatement in her father's will, the terms of which she had been misled
about. 403 S.E.2d at 636.
60. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1977):
(1) One who fails to disclose to another a fact that he knows may
justifiably induce the other to act or refrain from acting in a
business transaction is subject to the same liability to the other
as though he had represented the nonexistence of the matter
that he has failed to disclose, if but only if, he is under a duty to
the other to exercise reasonable care to disclose the matter in
question.
(2) One party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise
reasonable care to disclose to the other before the transaction is
consummated,
(a) matters known to him that the other is entitled to know
because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and
confidence between them; and
(c) subsequently acquired information that he knows will make
untrue or misleading a previous representation that when
made was true or believed to be so; and
(e) facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other is
about to enter into it under a mistake as to them, and that the
other, because of the relationship between them, the customs of
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analysis, in the hypothetical case of John and Wanda, if both
are current clients represented separately, yet simultaneously,
by Lawyer, Lawyer should decline to modify John's will, resulting in Lawyer having no definitive information concerning
changes to give to Wanda, 6 or if Lawyer makes the changes,
Lawyer should be under an affirmative obligation to disclose
that changes were made in order to afford Wanda an opportunity to modify her will accordingly. 6 2
Even absent an inquiry by Wanda, there is some authority
in other contexts that an affirmative duty of disclosure
exists
63
when the lawyer undertakes dual representation.
CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS INVOLVING FORMER CLIENTS

But it may be that Rule 1.7 is not applicable. If sufficient
facts are established to warrant the conclusion that representation of Wanda ended in 1990, Rule 1.9 may be the more appropriate rule to apply when considering whether to undertake the
representation John has requested. This Rule governs conflicts
of interests between former clients and current clients.6 Rule
1.9 provides greater leniency in many situations concerning the
representation." s While an attorney may not represent two
current clients simultaneously when their interests are "directly
adverse" absent client consent, 66 the attorney's limitation conthe trade or other objective circumstances, would reasonably
expect a disclosure of those facts.
61. This resolution contains much of the moral ambiguity identified by
authorities attempting to answer the question of "what does the lawyer really
know." See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHIcs app. B
(1990); see also Marvin Frankel, PartisanJustice: A Brief Revisit, A.B.A. LITIG.,
Summer 1989, at 43.
62. See generally Gerald P. Johnston, Legal Malpracticein Estate PlanningPerilous Times Ahead for the Practitioner,67 IOWA L. REV. 629, 654-58 (1982).
63. See People v. Bollinger, 681 P.2d 950 (Colo. 1984) (lawyer

disciplined for failing to keep buyers/clients advised of problems that
developed in transaction involving land offered for sale by seller/client);
Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Comstock, 327 A.2d 891 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974)
(lawyer representing both sides of a transaction under a common law duty to
disclose relevant information to both sides).
64. The pertinent part of Rule 1.9 provides:
(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall
not thereafter represent another person in the same or substantially
related matter in which the person's interests are materially adverse
to the interests of the former client unless the former client consents
after consultation.
65.

66.

MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 52, at 753.
MODEL RULES, supra note 6, Rule 1.7(a).
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cerning conflicts of interests with former clients is only
as to
67
matters which are "the same or substantially related."Modification of John's will is "the same matter" as the
estate planning that occurred in 1990 if "matter" is defined as a
continuous planning process. Such a definition may require
the lawyer to advise the client of relevant changes that affect
the current plan. 6" Alternatively "matter" may be defined as
the limited task of drafting and overseeing the execution of the
1990 wills, in which case the proposed modification is not "the
same matter." However, it seems disingenuous to suggest that
it is not a "substantially related matter."
The more difficult question is whether John's interest in
modifying his will is "materially adverse" to an interest of
Wanda's that should be recognized under the Rules.6 9 As a
current client, Wanda is entitled to new information Lawyer
receives that could reasonably be anticipated to affect her
estate planning.70 However, Lawyer's duty to Wanda as a former client diminishes, although it does not disappear
entirely.71
The duty to maintain confidences survives the drafting of
the wills, 72 as does the duty to refrain from seeking on behalf of
a new client to undo what was done on behalf of a former client. 73 Neither of these duties is implicated by the hypothetical
facts. Assisting John with the modification of his will does not
require that Lawyer use or disclose confidential information
from Wanda, 74 nor is John attempting to undo what was done
on behalf of Wanda.
The justification for forbidding representation of John,
absent consent by Wanda, lies in the agreement that was evidenced by the execution of mutual wills and the risk of
Wanda's misguided but continuing reliance on that agreement.
While most courts have not allowed the mere execution of
mutual wills to render unilateral revocation of either will
67. Id. Rule 1.9(a).
68. Cf. Lama Holding Co. v. Shearman & Sterling, 758 F. Supp. 159
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (firm subjected to malpractice liability for failure to advise
clients of changes in the tax law after specific assurance that notification of
change would be given).
69. See supra text accompanying notes 36-48.
70. See MODEL RULES, supra note 6, Rule 1.3 cmt. 3; see also
RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, supra note 54, § 381.
71. See WOLFRAM, supra note 15, § 7.4.1.
72. See MODEL RULES, supra note 6, Rule 1.6 cmt. 15 & 21.
73. See id. Rule 1.9 cmt. 1; see also RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, supra note
54, § 213.
74. See MODEL RULES, supra note 6, Rule 1.6 cmt. 21.
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impossible, 75 the competing concerns are fundamentally different. To prohibit Lawyer from representing John in the modification of his will, absent Wanda's consent, does not render
John unable to change his testamentary plan. It simply
requires John to obtain the services of another attorney. This
inconvenience does not impose burdens upon John comparable to a rule of law that would conclusively presume that the
execution of mutual wills evidences a contract not to revoke the
wills without all parties' consent. 76 In this case, John's interest
in an unfettered selection of counsel is outweighed by Wanda's
interest in not having the effect of her estate plan altered by her
lawyer (past or present) without her knowledge. Because John
seeks to modify unilaterally an estate plan that was initially the
product ofjoint planning by John and Wanda, the alteration is
materially adverse to the interest of Wanda in having her estate
plan integrate effectively with John's, and in having an accurate
understanding of the anticipated operation of her plan.
While there is some room for differing conclusions concerning its applicability, Rule 1.9, if applicable, requires Lawyer
either to obtain Wanda's consent to the dual representation or
to decline to represent John in this matter.7 7 In order for the
consent to be effective, Wanda must be informed of the nature
of the representation. At a minimum, this means informing her
ofJohn's intention to change his will. This disclosure can only
which the facts indicate is
be made with John's permission, 78efatiniaei
not forthcoming. 79 Absent Wanda's consent, the only option
left to Lawyer is to decline to assist John in this matter.8 °
CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS BETWEEN CLIENTS FOR THE
INTERMEDIARY LAWYER

Rule 2.2 is often referred to in attempts to find some
authority for the lawyer acting as counsel to both husband and

wife in an estate planning matter. 8 ' This may not be an appro75.

HASKELL, supra note 36, at 52.

76.
77.

See McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 45, at 385.
See Guidelinesfor Estate Planners, 13 PROB. NOTES 8 (1987); cf. HAZARD

& HODES, supra note 1, § 1.2:403.

78. See supra note 17.
79. See supra p. 106. "In response to Lawyer's question, John said that
he had not discussed changing his will or making the gift with anyone but
Lawyer, nor did he intend to."
80. See Mercer D. Tate, Handling Conflicts of Interest that may occur in an
Estate Planning Practice, EST. PLAN., Jan./Feb. 1989, at 32, 36.
81. Professor Shaffer suggests that "representation of the family" (see

infra text accompanying notes 97-124) may be permissible under Model Rule
2.2, discussing a lawyer's responsibilities when acting as an "intermediary."
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priate reference. The Comment after the Rule defines the situations in which a lawyer is acting as an intermediary:
A lawyer acts as intermediary under this Rule when the
lawyer represents two or more parties with potentially
conflicting interests. A key factor in defining the relationship is whether the parties share responsibility for the
may be
lawyer's fee, but the common representation
82
circumstances.
other
from
inferred
A lawyer acts as intermediary in seeking to establish or
adjust a relationship between clients on an amicable and
mutually advantageous basis; for example, in helping to
organize a business in which two or more clients are
entrepreneurs, working out the financial reorganization
of an enterprise in which two or more clients have an
interest, arranging a property distribution in settlement
83
of an estate or mediating a dispute between clients.
The Rule's recognition of the "joint representation" or
"lawyer for the family" models may be contained in the language "to establish or adjust a relationship between clients on
an amicable and mutually advantageous basis." 4 As lawyer for
the family, the lawyer helps the client fully recognize its purposes and desires. Recognition of the family's purposes is a
form of adjustment, and thus may be encompassed by Rule
2.2.85 During joint representation the lawyer seeks to assist clients provide for the disposition of their property on an amicable and mutually advantageous basis.
These interpretations ignore the absence of any reference
to families or couples in the Rule, which uses only business
relationships or similar transactions as exemplars.8 6 While particular estate plans may require "adjusting the relationship" of
the husband and wife to certain pieces of property (for examHowever, he notes that this analysis finds greater support in the commentary
than it does in the text of the Rule. Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of
Radical Individualism, 65 TEx. L. REV. 963, 974 (1987) [hereinafter Shaffer,
Legal Ethics]. A shorter version of the same article can be found as Thomas L.
Shaffer, The Family as a Client - Conflict or Community, 34 RES GESTAE 62 (1990)
[hereinafter Shaffer, Family as a Client]; see also Gerald Le Van, Lawyers, Families
and Feelings: Representing the Family Relationship, PROB. & PROP., Jan./Feb. 1990,
at 20.
82. MODEL RULES, supra note 6, Rule 2.2 cmt. 1.
83. Id. cmt. 3.
84. See Shaffer, Legal Ethics, supra note 81, at 974.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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ple, severing or creating joint tenancies, intrafamily gifts and
transfers, etc.), this type of adjustment is not usually the primary purpose of the representation. 7 Instead the primary
purpose of the representation is not to establish or adjust the
relationship between the clients, but rather to establish or
adjust the relationship of the clients with others whom the lawyer may or may not represent - children, creditors, the taxing
authorities.
Additionally, joint representation or representation of the
family for estate planning is not primarily concerned with creating mutual advantages for the husband and wife. "I'll leave all
my property to you if you'll leave all your property to me, and
when we are both dead, the children will get the property,"
does not reflect the typical statement between spouses heard by
estate planners. Such an understanding reduces estate planning by couples to a process of bargaining for personal benefits. While a small number of clients perceive estate planning
in this manner, the vast majority of clients do not. A statement
more likely to be overheard is "We want to make sure whoever
dies last is taken care of while the survivor is alive, and the kids
get whatever is left." The clients are more focused on caring
for their families after their death."8
The express consideration of estate planning in the comments to Rule 1.7, and the absence of any such consideration in
the text of or comments to Rule 2.2, lend further support for
the conclusion that Rule 2.2 was not intended to encompass
conduct such as estate planning for both spouses. For these
reasons, Rule 2.2 does not seem to be controlling in an analysis
of the hypothetical facts.
Assuming arguendo that Rule 2.2 is applicable, the options
available to Lawyer in the hypothetical situation are no greater
than those under Rule 1.789 or 1.9.90 Rule 2.2 requires that the
lawyer "consult with each client concerning the decisions t be
made"'" or withdraw if the lawyer comes to reasonably believe
87. Other examples include where clients wish to "guarantee
reciprocity or binding mirror-image wills or conclude an agreement
exchanging or modifying spousal rights." AMERICAN BAR ASS'N SECTION OF
REAL PROPERTY,
PROBATE AND
TRUST,
SPECIAL STUDY
COMM.
ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE
LAWYER'S DUTIES IN REPRESENTING HUSBAND AND WIFE 11 (Preliminary Draft

No. 3, Mar. 3, 1992).
88. THOMAS L. SHAFFER, DEATH, PROPERTY AND LAw 3-10 (1970).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
90. See supra text accompanying note 77.
91.
MODEL RULES, supra note 6, Rule 2.2(b).
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that the common representation can no longer be undertaken
impartially.9 2 Thus Lawyer must either obtain John's permission to disclose enough information to Wanda to consult with
her concerning John's intention to make a gift and change his
will, or decline to representJohn in the modification of his will.
FOUR MODELS OF REPRESENTATION

The hypothetical problem of John and Wanda illustrates
some of the difficulties that are inherent in representing both
spouses for estate planning. The initial identification of the client and the type of representation may have dramatic consequences as the representation proceeds. Recognition of this
fact has led to the current debate about the proper response
when asked to represent both spouses. Four possible
responses have emerged: (1) lawyer for the family;9 3 (2) separate representation by separate lawyers;9 4 (3) separate simultaneous representation by the same lawyer;9 5 and (4) joint
representation by the same lawyer.9 6 Each of these responses
is supported by strong arguments concerning the morality and
autonomy of both lawyer and client.
LAWYER FOR THE FAMILY

Professor Thomas L. Shaffer urges estate planning lawyers
to define their relationships with clients as "lawyers of the family," 9 rather than lawyers involved in joint representation of
two amicable individuals. Having the family as client is premised upon a recognition that the "family" is distinct from the
sum of consensual points of contact between the husband and
wife.9 8 Instead the family is an "organic community" that
92. Id. Rule 2.2 (c).
93. Under this model of representation, the client is identified as the
"family" instead of the individuals within the family. This model is discussed
in the text accompanying notes 97-124.
94. This model of representation requires that the husband and wife
are represented independantly by separate lawyers. This model of
representation is discussed in the text accompanying notes 125-51.
95. This model of representation requires that the clients meet with the
lawyer individually and agree that the lawyer will not disclose confidences
obtained during those individual meetings to the other spouse. This model
of representation is discussed in the text accompanying notes 152-94.

96. This model of representation requires that the clients agree that all
confidences will be shared with both spouses, who are both identified as
clients of the attorney. This model of representation is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 195-207.
97. Shaffer, Legal Ethics, supra note 81, at 970.

98.

Id. at 970 n.26.
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exists before, during, and after the existence of the individual.9 9 It is the complex of relationships in which the client
lives. This differs from the alternative contemporary conception of "family," which is a relationship that an individual is
"in." By the characterization of the person being "in" a family,
the person is seen as independent of and totally separable from
the family.
While Professor Shaffer argues that his vision is grounded
in moral reality, it finds support in common law as well. The
basis for recognition of tenancy by the entirety is unity of husband and wife.' 0 0 At common law any property held in tenancy
by the entireties was considered the property of the couple, as a
single entity' 0 ' - thus giving practical affect to the biblical
observation "the two shall become one."' 0 2 Property held by
the entireties was subject to the debts of the husband as head
of the family, but could not be partitioned.1 03 In most jurisdictions, unilateral partition is still forbidden.'0 4 However, with
the passage of the Married Women's Property Acts, many jurisdictions decided that creditors' claims against property held in
tenancy by the entireties could only be founded upon joint
obligations of both husband and wife.' 0 5 This change was due
99. Id. at 965.
100. See United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363 (1939). For a more
contemporary discussion of the origins and characteristics of the tenancy by
the entirety, see Spessard v. Spessard, 494 A.2d 701 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1985).
101. See In re Morris' Estate, 177 N.W. 266 (Mich. 1920) (tenancy by the
entireties grows out of the unity of husband and wife, which is unlike joint
tenants, who are seized of an undivided moiety. Rather, the husband and the
wife do not hold by moieties, but "take as one person, taking as a corporation
would take.").
102. "For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be
united to his wife, and they will become one flesh." Genesis 2:24 (NIV Bible).
103. See Masonry Products, Inc. v. Tees, 280 F. Supp. 654, 656 (D.V.I.
1968) (holding that the interest of a husband in property held by the entirety,
in his own right and jure uxoris, was subject to the satisfaction of his
individual debts, subject to the contingency that if the wife survived him she
would be entitled to the whole estate).
104. Id. at 657 ("It is the view of the great majority of American
jurisdictions

which recognize the estate by the entirety

that since the

enactment of the Married Women's Property Act this unity of estate is
indestructible by the unilateral act of either spouse so long as the marriage
subsists.").

105. Cf City Fin. Co. v. Kloostra, 209 N.W.2d 498 (Mich. App. 1973)
(A married woman co-signed a promissory note with her husband. Judgment
on the note could only be satisfied out of property held jointly with her
husband. Wife's separate property was not liable for the debt unless
consideration from the note passed directly to her separate estate).
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to the Act's recognition of wives' equality with their husbands
in the control of the marital estate, converting the common law
unity of unequals into a unity of equals.'" 6 Thus the unity
remained a legally recognized relationship with rights and
duties greater than those afforded
to individuals joined in own0 7
ership through joint tenancy.'
Shaffer's vision of family as greater than the two individuals seeking representation is also validated by the various statutory schemes of inheritance for individuals dying intestate.
The uniform statutory preference for family over other potential recipients'0 8 recognizes the human desire to perpetuate
self beyond death through the transmission of property to
those identified as family.' 0 9 People want to establish and
transmit those things that they value deeply. "[T]o ourselves
and our posterity. .."110 is not limited to political liberties and
institutions. Put more colloquially, "[t]his business of making
wills should strengthen the family now, and give it a source of
strength for later, when these two people are dead and their
children are fighting over the pickle crock.""'
As lawyer to the family, Lawyer would be required to act in
the family's interest, which may include acting as a catalyst for a
dialogue between John and Wanda concerning John's present
and future gifts to the ministry. 1 2 In describing the proper3
course of conduct for a hypothetical attorney in a situation''
similar to that of Lawyer's, Shaffer writes:
[T]he most irresponsible thing a lawyer could do is to
send either of these people to another lawyer, or both of
them to two other lawyers. If that is the command of our
professional ethics, or even the easiest available "solution" to the case from our regulatory rules, then our ethics and our rules are corrupting. They corrupt the family
106.

See Otto F. Stifel's Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy, 201 S.W. 67 (Mo.

1918); Lang v. Commissioner, 289 U.S. 109 (1933).
107. See Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291 (Haw. 1977); Michigan v.
Wallace, 434 N.W.2d 422 (Mich. App. 1988).
108. See HASKELL, supra note 36, at 10.
109. See Shaffer, Legal Ethics, supra note 81, at 936; see also SHAFFER, supra
note 88, at 8.
110. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
111. Shaffer, Family as a Client, supra note 81, at 62.
112. See Shaffer, Legal Ethics, supra note 81, at 989.
113. Professor Shaffer analyzes the hypothetical facts contained in
Williams, supra note 27, at 484; a lawyer who drafted wills for a couple on the
basis of joint interviews, immediately after the husband executes his will but
prior to the wife executing hers, is privately told by the wife that her will does
not reflect her testamentary desires.
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in general, and this family in particular. A lawyer following the rules is irresponsible because in fact, the family is
the lawyer's client. The lawyer who sends the family away
is not able to respond to his client. He is disabled by a
false ethic and, in trying to protect himself, he harms his
client." 14
The goal of a lawyer engaged in estate planning for the family
should be to render a truthful description of the family and
their property through the language of the law." 5 In the case
of John and Wanda, this can only be done if Lawyer exerts
moral suasion in convincing John to reveal to Wanda his intentions to make a gift and alter his will.
This result is different from the answer reached under the
more traditional model ofjoint representation by the same lawyer. Joint representation would require Lawyer either to disclose the proposed course of action to Wanda and obtain her
consent prior to assisting John with the changes" 16 or to withdraw from representing John in estate planning matters." 7
While the lawyer operating within either the "lawyer for
the family" model or the "joint representation" model may
facilitate disclosure of John's intentions to Wanda, the purposes the lawyer seeks to achieve are fundamentally different.
As lawyer for the family, Lawyer's interest in disclosure to
Wanda is in having the family "learn how to take John's purposes into account, becauseJohn is in the family."" 8 "Being a
family means taking purposes and secrets into account, because
being in a family means primarily that a person is known, even
before she knows." 1 19
As a lawyer engaged in joint representation, Lawyer's
interest in disclosure to Wanda is in having Wanda agree to the
use of Lawyer's skills in altering documents drafted for and
controlled by another individual. This approach presumes
John's exercise of individual autonomy in making the gift and
changing the will is morally permissible, only requiring disclosure in order to insure that Lawyer can assist John despite Lawyer's present or prior representation of Wanda. The interest of
the family in understanding the desires of John is not a
consideration.
114.

Shaffer, Legal Ethics, supra note 81, at 982.

115.
116.

Id. at 968-70.

117.
118.

Id. Rule 1.6 cmt. 2.
Cf.Shaffer, Legal Ethics, supra note 81, at 976.

119.

Id. at 982.

MODEL RULES,

supra note 6, Rule 1.7(a).
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The Rules do not encompass the moral reality about which
Professor Shaffer writes. The model of lawyer for the family
requires recognition that marriage and family relationships are
grounded in covenant and status, 120 rather than consent and
contract.12 This is not the dominant view of marriage embodied in American law today. 1 2 2 To the extent that law is representative of our public mores, 23 the widespread availability of
no-fault divorce seems to reflect a belief that marriage is simply
a consensual arrangement between two adults that can be dissolved when the consent no longer exists.' 24 If the majority of
Americans believe marriage is a contractual matter rather than
120. Id. at 970-71; see also INSTITUTE IN BASIC YOUTH CONFLICTS, THE
TRUE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WEDDING COVENANT 7-9 (1985). "The traditions
of a Christian wedding grow out of God's covenant relationship' with Israel
and Christ's relationship with the believer. The covenant differs from a
contract in that it is based on trust between parties, based on unlimited
responsibility, and cannot be broken if new circumstances occur." Id. at 6;
Malachi 2:14 ("[S]he is thy companion and the wife of thy covenant.").
121. See ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART:
INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 85-112 (1986). "If love
and marriage are seen primarily in terms of psychological gratification, they
may fail to fulfill their older social function of providing people with stable,
committed relationships that tie them into the larger society." Id. at 85; see
also ANDREW M. GREELEY, FAITHFUL ATTRACTION: DISCOVERING INTIMACY,
LOVE AND FIDELITY IN AMERICAN MARRIAGE (1991):

The marriage bond between a man and a woman is more than a
legal contract, though it may begin with a contract and involve the
continuation of a contract through the life together. It is a union of
minds and bodies, not union in the romantic or ideal sense, but
rather as that which occurs in the hard reality of everyday life. A
man and woman come together to share life and contract a union
which at times seems to be more powerful than the consent that
either of them has brought to it. The bond can be broken, though
not as easily as it is entered, but it has, as the data in this study show,
remarkable durability.
Id. at 240-41.
122. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW
PROPERTY (1981). The author speaks of the "new family" as:
[A] convenient way of referring to that group of changes that
characterizes 20th century Western marriages and family behavior,
such as increasing fluidity, detachability and interchangeability of
family relationships .... The new family is a concept that represents
a variety of co-existing family types.
Id. at 3-4.
123. See Gregg Temple, Freedom of Contract and Intimate Relationships, 8
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 121, 150 (1985) ("Where marriage once served a
variety of institutional functions, the current marriage is a vehicle for
personal happiness and fulfillment.").
124. Id. at 151. ("[T]raditional goal of permanence no longer
represents the norm [for marriages] . . . the high divorce rate reflects
personal fulfillment function of marriage.").
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one of covenant or permanent status, the model of lawyer for
the family is inconsistent with this view. This inconsistency is
not sufficient grounds for prohibiting an agreement to act as
"lawyer for the family" between lawyer and clients who share
this understanding of the relationship. However, such an
inconsistency does preclude this form of representation being
the required norm for representation pertaining to estate planning for spouses.
SEPARATE REPRESENTATION BY SEPARATE LAWYERS

Based on a premise that spouses are more properly viewed
as independent individuals, many commentators recommend
that the lawyer advise spouses that separate representation may
be in their long-term best interest when the lawyer is
approached by a couple asking for representation in order to
plan their estates.' 2 5 This is particularly true if either spouse
has children from a prior relationship, 12 6 or any other ongoing
individual commitment that involves both financial support and
emotional involvement. In those circumstances the lawyer
should be sensitive to the very real possibility that either
spouse may be reluctant to share information concerning his or
her true testamentary desires in the presence of the other. This
reluctance can arise for many reasons. It may be a means of
avoiding conflict over the "fairness" of the client's desires,127
an attempt to avoid hurting the other spouse's feelings by disclosing a candid evaluation of the relationship with the children
those
or step-children, 2 8 or simply a refusal publicly to affirm
29
actions that the client wants to engage in privately.'
Separate representation by separate counsel is perceived
as maximizing individual client autonomy while minimizing the
possibility that counsel will be faced with a difficult moral
125. See RESTATEMENT GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 14, § 201; see
also Williams, supra note 27, at 486.
126. See Jackson M. Bruce, Ethics in Estate Planning and Estate
Administration, 15 PROB. NOTES 118, 120 (1989); see also Ronald C. Link et al.,
Developments Regarding the Professional Responsibility of the Estate Planning Lawyer:
The Effect of the Model Rules for ProfessionalConduct, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.
J. 1, 11 (1987).
127. See Williams, supra note 27, at 484; see also Pennell, supra note 20, at
18-7.
128. See Bruce, supra note 19, at 120; see also Committee Report, supra note

19, at 11.
129. See Committee Report, supra note 19; see also Jeffrey N. Pennell, Ethics
In Estate Planningand FiduciaryAdministration: The Inadequacy of the Model Rules
and the Model Code, 45 THE RECORD (A.B.C.N.Y.) 715, 740 (1990).

AND THE TWO SHALL BECOME AS ONE

19931

dilemma."' ° This form of representation is clearly within the
Model Rules and is consistent with the overall vision of transactional practice embodied in them.'
The current draft of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers contains an illustration similar to the circumstances surrounding John and Wanda's 1990 consultation with
Lawyer:
Husband and Wife consulted Lawyer for estate planning
advice and drafting of reciprocal wills. One spouse told
Lawyer their common preferences, and the other concurred. At the outset of the representation, Lawyer
explained that separate counsel could assure both Husband and Wife that each would receive independent
advice and that, if desired, each client's communications
would be privileged from each other if they were separately represented. If Husband and Wife gave informed
and uncoerced 3 2consent, Lawyer may undertake the
representation.

This example evidences a clear bias toward separate representation, although the commentary on the example cautions lawyers from assuming conflict when none exists.1 33 The
underlying assumptions about the attorney-client relationship
seem to be:
First, a lawyer's proper employment is by or for an individual. Second, employment by or for more than one
individual is exceptional. Third, as a consequence, multiple party employment is necessarily superficial. Finally,
the means for protecting the superficiality (or, if you like,
the means for protecting the principle that employment
is ordinarily and properly by or for individuals) is ignorance of any facts
known to one of the individuals but not
34
to the other.'

130. This perception is not impervious to criticism however.
Adherents to contemporary theories of determinism might challenge the
underlying premise that individual autonomy exists, thus rendering
nonsensical the conclusion that separate representation is valuable because it
enhances autonomy. Alternatively, this perception can be challenged by the
more pragmatic observation that isolating the individual from his or her
spouse automatically limits the client's choices to those that do not require
certainty concerning the actions of the spouse.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 9-11.
132. RESTATEMENT GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 14, § 211(c) illus.

1.
133. Id.
134. These assumptions are identified by Professor Shaffer in his
analysis of the resolutions offered to the dilemma posed in Williams, supra
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The advantages to clients of separate representation are
identified as "independent advice" and "communications that
would be privileged from each other."' 3 5 No definition of
"independent advice" is offered by the authors of the Restatement, nor does the Restatement cite any authority for its implication that independent advice is available only through
separate counsel. Model Rule 2.1 states that "[i]n representing
a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice."' I 6 Nowhere in the text or
commentary of the Rules is there any indication that the lawyer's obligation under this Rule is excused when the lawyer
undertakes joint representation. 137 In the estate planning literature, the duty to exercise "independent judgment" is discussed in the context of conflicting interests of the attorney
who is asked to serve as a fiduciary of the estate, 38 but that is
clearly not the meaning that the authors of the Restatement
intend to communicate with the use of the phrase "independent advice."
The context of the phrase "independent advice" suggests
that advice given during joint representation will somehow be
"dependent advice." But what will it be "dependent" uponthe candor of the clients in describing their desires in joint conferences? Certainly the advice given will be directly related to
the clients' wishes as they are communicated. To suppose anything else is to suppose advice which would be irrelevant or
misleading.
Perhaps the authors unconsciously fell victim to the very
trap they warn the lawyer to avoid: "trying to suggest discord
when none exists."' 3 9 Or perhaps the example is premised
upon a belief that the lawyer, counseling two clients jointly, will
give advice which is the result of some type of subconscious
alignment with the interests of one or the other party. Alternatively, the implied limitation upon independent advice may be
an unwitting recognition that as lawyers "we assume that the
note 27, at 484. See Shaffer, Legal Ethics, supra note 81, at 969. He does not

comment upon the example in the Restatement.
135. Id.
136. MODEL RULES, supra note 6, Rule 2.1.
137.

Some

support

for

this

position

might

be

gleaned

by

the

requirement of impartiality imposed upon the attorney seeking to act as an
intermediary under Model Rule 2.2, but impartiality and independence are
distinct obligations that may or may not be totally congruent in any given
case.

138.

See Pennell, supra note 20, at 18-20 to 18-26.
RESTATEMENT GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 14, § 211. See supra
text accompanying notes 132-33.
139.
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client wants us to maximize his material or tactical position in
every way that is legally permissible, regardless of non-legal
considerations." 140 In joint representation such an unspoken
and thus unauthorized assumption becomes untenable.
Whatever the underlying premise, the authors of the
Restatement should state it in order to allow critical examination of the premise on the basis of its reflection of practical
reality and its logical appeal. Absent some justification in
either experience or logic, it is wrong to suggest that the lawyer
undertaking joint representation will render less "independent
advice."
However separate representation may hold other professional advantages141 for lawyers and thus for their clients that
are not clearly identified in the Restatement. The Restatement
refers to "separate counsel" indicating that separate representation be undertaken by two independent lawyers. 142 Separate
representation frees the lawyer from concerns about divided
loyalties, although it does not completely eliminate the possibility that counsel will be faced with difficult moral questions in
the course of representing the individual client. 14 3 As lawyer to
140. FREEDMAN, supra note 61, at 51.
141. By use of the phrase "professional advantages" I mean to
distinguish those advantages that reflect the nature of a profession dedicated
to public service, from the advantages that reflect the commercial aspect of
practice that is shared with any other trade or lawful means of making money.
Clearly an ethical rule that required separate representation by separate
counsel in all estate planning matters would result in a short term increase in
fees generated by estate planning for couples who were sophisticated enough
to recognize that resort to laymen's guides to will drafting would not satisfy
their needs.
142. Separate representation by separate counsel should be chosen by
the clients prior to any in-depth discussion of their estate planning needs, in
order to avoid creating a conflict of interest that would preclude the lawyer
consulted initially from representing either spouse. Cf. Hughes v. Paine,
Webber, Jackson and Curtis, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 663 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
(preliminary interview to discuss possible representation may be sufficient to
create attorney-client relationship for purposes of conflict of interests rules).
143. An example of a moral dilemma that could arise in the course of
separate representation by separate counsel is presented by the following fact
pattern modified from a problem presented in JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E.
KRIER, PROPERTY 360 (2d ed. 1988):
Husband and wife live in Ohio, and have been married for 30 years.
From Husband's earnings during marriage Husband accumulates
personal property worth $500,000. Under Ohio law, Wife has, at
Husband's death, an elective share of one-half of Husband's
property. After retirement, Husband and Wife move to a
community property state. Under the law of the community
property state, Husband's personal property comes in as separate
property. There is no provision to recognize quasi-community
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only one spouse, the risk is minimized that the lawyer will be
faced with conflicting duties to preserve client confidences' 4 4
and to give information to another client. 14 5 Absent such con46
flict, the lawyer need not determine which duty is superior,
nor is there any danger of inadvertent disclosure of confidential information due to the internal conflict of the lawyer.' 47 It
is through both the absence of conflicting duties and the professional mandate to maintain confidences that the client
receives a full measure of secrecy, which is the second advantage
of separate
representation
identified
in
the
Restatement. 148
When secrecy is desired by the client, this form of representation is best, and should be available. Subject to the inherent limitations in solitary planning, 49 this option provides
clients both the maximum attorney loyalty to their interests as
the clients individually define them at the time of representation, as well as the greatest protection of confidences. It is consistent with the present dominant cultural view of marriage as a
property during probate, nor to apply the law of the domicile where
title to the property was acquired. Husband comes to Lawyer and
asks that Lawyer draft a will leaving all of his property to Bubbles La
Rue. Lawyer explains that this would effectively leave Wife with
nothing, yet Husband persists in his request that the will leave
nothing to Wife.
Should Lawyer assist Husband in this exercise of his "autonomy"? The
moral issue of whether to facilitate the husband's disinheritance of his wife is
intertwined with the jurisprudential questions concerning the law governing
the husband's acts. None of the states where the couple resided intended to
permit complete disinheritance of a spouse, yet because of the varied statutory schemes applicable at varied times, that result may occur. Is the content
of the law controlled by its letter or its spirit? For a similar dilemma in the
area of family law and its resolution see American Academy of Matrimonial
Lawyers, The Bounds of Advocacy, provisions 2.10 & 2.26 and accompanying
commentary, reprinted in GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 1, at 62-63.

Failure to struggle with such questions when they are presented validates
Professor Shaffer's conclusion that "[iut is much easier for a lawyer to behave
as if he were a clerk in a driver's-license office than to behave as someone who
invites trust from families and then charges by the hour for accepting it."
Shaffer, Legal Ethics, supra note 81, at 984.
144. MODEL RULES, supra note 6, Rule 1.6 (reproduced in note 17); cf.
RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, supra note 54, § 395.
145. Cf RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, supra note 54, § 381 (reproduced in

note 54).
146.
147.
148.

See supra text accompanying note 54.
See Pennell, supra note 20, at 18-29.
RESTATEMENT GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 14, § 211. "Each

client's communications would be privileged from each other.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 139-40.
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consensual arrangement, 150 and is most consistent with the
assumptions about the attorney-client relationship
underlying
5
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.'1
SEPARATE SIMULTANEOUS REPRESENTATION BY THE SAME

LAWYER

In an attempt to obtain the advantages of separate representation by separate counsel while minimizing the adverse
impact of the inherent limitations in a solitary planning process, a third model of representation has emerged, that of separate simultaneous representation by the same lawyer.
Professor Jeffrey N. Pennell has provided the most extensive
written commentary on this form of representation. 152 He
argues that it is a viable option that should be permitted if the
clients are made aware of the various models of representation
and select separate simultaneous representation by the attorney. 5' 3 This position is contrary to the original position proposed by the Professional Standards Committee of the
American College of Probate Counsel:' 5 4
An ACPC Fellow ordinarily should not represent both husband
and wife separately, i.e., where the plans and confidences of each
spouse are intended to remain confidential as to the other spouse.
The Fellow who does undertake to represent a husband
and wife, separately should advise them, preferably in
writing, that:
(A) the confidences of each spouse will not be
shared with the other spouse and
(B) the Fellow may be giving advice and taking
action for the benefit of one spouse that may be
detrimental
to the interests of the other
55
spouse.'

150. See supra text accompanying notes 120-24.
151.
See supra notes 6-17 and accompanying text.
152. See Pennell, supra note 20; see also Pennell, supra note 129.
153. Pennell, supra note 20, at 18-29.
154. The American College of Probate Counsel (ACPC) is the
predecessor to the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel (ACTEC).

These organizations were formed to provide a forum for the discussion of
issues arising in a probate and trust practice. Membership in the
organization is by invitation, and is limited to attorneys who have practiced
for ten or more years, with a substantial amount of their practice devoted to
representation relating to probate, trust or estate planning.

155. American College of Probate Counsel, Professional Standards
Committee Guideline: Representation of Husband and Wife in Estate Planning, 15
PROB. NOTES 199 (1989) [hereinafter Representation of Husband and Wife].
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Separate simultaneous representation had been considered by
15 6
the, Committee and rejected as "practically unworkable."'
Only after "very substantial comments at the Board of Regents
meeting"' 15 7 following the report of the Committee was the
proposal withdrawn. The comments appear to have been raising two independent concerns: 1) promulgation of any standards in addition to the state bar rules simply provides
malpractice lawyers with a ready-made standard of care and
58
adds little to the professionalism of the estate planning bar;'
and 2) limiting or prohibiting separate simultaneous representation precludes a desirable form of representation without
adequate justification. 159
The first concern seems to be resolved in favor of promulgating professional standards independent of local or state bar
rules. 160 The second concern has been accommodated by
modification of the proposed standard permitting separate
simultaneous representation as an alternative to the more
traditional joint representation.' 6 ' But is this modification the
best course of action? Is separate simultaneous representation
a valid model of representation, thus warranting express affirmation in a professional standard? Is the model entitled to
presumptive validity, or must it be shown to further the profession's interest in providing competent and loyal service to the
public? Proponents of inclusion argue that the model is entitled to presumptive validity.' 6 2 They also assert that separate
simultaneous representation can be shown to have advantages
for clients that are unavailable in the traditional models ofjoint
or separate representation by separate
representation
3
lawyers. 16
Separate simultaneous representation has been undertaken by some respected members of the bar without any
156.

Bruce, supra note 19, at 121; see also Jackson M. Bruce, Estate

Planning Ethics: Clarification of Outline, 15 PROB. NOTES 198 (1989).

157.

Husband and Wife Representation Guideline Withdrawn; Project to

Continue, 15 PROB. NOTES 302 (1990).

158. See Professional Standards Committee of the American College of
Trusts and Estates Counsel, Report on ACTEC Fall Seminar - The Debate:
Should the College Adopt Standards and Guidelines on Risks of Malpractice and
Conflicts of Interest?, 17 ACTEC NOTES 171 (Winter 1991) [hereinafter The
Debate].

159.
160.
(Summer
161.
162.
163.

See Springs, supra note 27, at 48.
See Thomas P. Sweeney, President'sMessage, 18 ACTEC NOTES 1, 5
1992).
Id.
See Springs, supra note 27, at 48.
Pennell, supra note 20, at 18-29.
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intractable problems. Therefore, it is argued that the practice
is entitled to presumptive validity.' 64 This argument is not persuasive when drafting professional regulations. Such an argument misperceives the test for regulation as whether any lawyer
can engage in the conduct without undue adverse consequences.1 65 The experience of these members of the bar is
helpful in knowing how frequently anticipated ill effects actually occur, but no systematic collection of this information has
been publicly undertaken., Instead individual experience often
forms the basis of an argument cast in terms of toleration,
extolling the virtues of diversity in models of representations.
Yet carried to its logical extreme, "toleration" in the area of
professional regulation would result in no regulation at all.
Assuming that separate simultaneous representation must
be proven to be valid, the primary benefit of this model is that,
16 6
while individual confidentiality is maintained by agreement,
both clients are permitted an unrestricted choice of counsel.
Individual confidentiality is not unique to this model of repre-'
sentation. It is also available through the model of separate
representation by separate lawyers. Separate counsel insures
that attorney contact with the non-client spouse is minimized.
Thus opportunities for inadvertent or intentional disclosure of
confidential information are minimized.' 6 7 Also minimized is
any confusion as to who is entitled to the loyalty of the attor164. See Springs, supra note 27, at 48.
165. There is little doubt that many lawyers could safeguard client
funds without the strict requirements surrounding client trust accounts
contained in Model Rule 1.15, yet the risk of and harm from
misappropriation of client funds is sufficiently compelling that every state
requires separate accounts. A number of states impose additional accounting
requirements beyond those contained in the text of the Model Rule. A partial
collection of the state modifications appears in GILLERS & SIMON, supra note
1, at 127-29.
Arguing that a practice should remain unregulated because some
members of the bar engage in.it also renders advocates for regulation
vulnerable to charges that positions contrary to the current practices of any
respected member of the bar are disguised ad hominem attacks on those
practitioners. Thus, too often what should be a dispassionate examination of
the merits of a practice become a battle of honor, with each side seeking to
justify either personal practice or opposition for reasons independent of the
best interests of the public and the profession.
166. See Pennell, supra note 20, at 18-29.
167. RESTATEMENT GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 14, § 201 cmt. b
("Preventing use of confidential client information against interests of the
client, either for the lawyer's personal interest or in aid of some other client,
would be more difficult in the absence of conflicts rules that reduce the
opportunity for such use.").
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ney. The attorney should be loyal to the client.' 6 8 The model
of separate simultaneous representation does not afford these
advantages. Contact with both clients will be extensive thus
creating numerous opportunities for inadvertent or intentional
disclosures, and no guidance is given to the lawyer concerning
where his or her ultimate loyalty should lie if a conflict develops between the interests of the two clients.
According to the proponents of this method of representation, both of these flaws are cured by the clients' informed consent. 16 9 Yet defining the nature of the consent that would be
sufficiently informed is daunting. While a lawyer might present
stereotypical scenarios to the clients in an attempt to illustrate
the problems that could develop in the course of separate
simultaneous representation, 17 0 the diversity of human experience renders it unlikely that the lawyer will describe the exact
dilemma that may emerge in representing these particular clients. 17 1 Absent accurate prognostication by the lawyer, the
enforceability of the client's consent becomes tenuous, rendering equally tenuous any defense to claims of breach of fiduciary
72
duty. 1

By requiring the lawyer to maintain individual confidences,
the clients are not necessarily waiving any objection to the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to instructions received during
those individual meetings. 73 Indeed, such a waiver may contradict Rule 1.8 of the Model Rules forbidding waiver of pro168. See [Model Standards: Conflicts of Interest] LAWS. MAN. ON PROF.
CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 51:104 (1990) ("[L]oyahy is an indispensable element
of a lawyer's relationship with a client.") (quoting ABA Comm. on
Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1495 (1982)).
169. See ABA Special Study Comm. on Professional Responsibility,
Comments and Recommendations on The Lawyer's Duties in Representing Husband and
Wife, Preliminary Draft (Mar. 13, 1992) at 20-21; see also Pennell, supra note
20, at 18-32, 18-33.
170. See, e.g., Pennell, supra note 20, at 18-27.
171. This is particularly true when considered in conjunction with the
likely timing for obtaining such consent (most typically at the very beginning
of representation when the lawyer has very few facts from which to create
relevant hypothetical fact patterns). Should the attorney be unlucky enough
to describe with any accuracy the fact pattern that is the basis for the clients
requesting separate representation, client reaction may be sufficiently strong
that any further relationship with the client is difficult if not impossible.
172. See RESTATEMENT GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 14, § 202 cmt.
c; see also RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, supra note 54, § 392 cmt. b (providing that
where an agent has confidential information that can not be disclosed and
that is of such a nature that fair advice can not be given to one of two known
principals, the agent cannot properly continue to act as adviser).
173. MODEL RULES, supra note 6, Rule 1.8(h).
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spective liability for malpractice unless the client obtains
independent counsel concerning the waiver. 174 While the rule
uses the general term "malpractice," the specific cause of
action that seems most likely to arise during separate simulta75
neous representation is breach of fiduciary duty. 1
It is easy to imagine a hypothetical fact pattern giving rise
to such a claim. Lawyer agrees to undertake separate simultaneous representation of Charles and Diane,' 76 a couple that
appears to be happily married. After a careful explanation by
Lawyer of the four alternative models of representation and the
benefits and risks inherent in each, Charles tells Lawyer that
they would like to be represented separately, with private disclosures to the attorney kept between the lawyer and client
only. Diane nods her approval of this arrangement and Lawyer
schedules individual meetings with both. During the initial
meetings Lawyer learns that almost all assets are held in
Charles' name. The size of the joint estate leads Lawyer to
mention the possibility of transferring assets to Diane in order
to equalize their estates, minimizing their aggregate estate
taxes. Charles seems open to this possibility and Lawyer
prepares various hypothetical fact patterns to illustrate the tax
consequences of the transfers. Charles agrees to the transfers,
and Lawyer prepares all the necessary documents. During this
time Lawyer continues to meet with Charles and Diane individually incident to preparing their wills. Only after all transfer
documents have been prepared, and drafts sent to Charles,
does Diane mention to Lawyer how unhappy she has been during her marriage. She discloses that she is considering leaving
Charles after assets have been transferred to her, insuring her
ability to live independently. What does Lawyer do?
Lawyer could explain to Diane the duty of Lawyer to give
information to Charles. The fact that such a duty can be
subordinate to another duty must also be explained, with Lawyer's duty to maintain Diane's confidences arguably being the
superior duty. Lawyer might then request Diane's consent to
disclose her intentions to Charles prior to the transfers, but the
chances of obtaining such consent seem small.
174.
175.

Id.

See [Model Standards: Malpractice] LAws. MAN. ON PROF.
(ABA/BNA) 301:114-15 (1984).
176. Assuming a physical manifestation of consent would be sufficient
for purposes of obtaining valid consent. Many commentators suggest that
written consent is the proper manner in which to handle this situation in the
event of any future dispute.
CONDUCT
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Lawyer could elect to tell Charles of Diane's plan, while
impressing upon him the need to keep the disclosure secret.
By such conduct Lawyer has created two claims in Diane: 1)
breach of fiduciary duty through the unauthorized disclosure of
confidential information,"' and 2) fraud or deceit if the
78
"secret" is successful for any period of time.'
Alternatively, Lawyer could do nothing, literally, in the
hopes that by procrastination the transfers would be stopped
without any unauthorized disclosure of confidential informa79
tion. This course of action, while perhaps the most likely,'
could result in liability for negligence if Charles dies prior to
making desired transfers due to Lawyer's inertia.
Assuming Lawyer unflinchingly participates as counsel
during the transfers, Lawyer may be sued by Charles for breach
of fiduciary duty. The most likely claim would be that Lawyer
had failed to give pertinent information to Charles.' 8 ° Lawyer
would then raise Charles' consent to withholding information
as an affirmative defense.'
Charles is apt to respond that
Lawyer had exceeded the terms of the consent to withhold
information, 82 or that the particular consequences of the consent were not identified at the time consent was obtained. 8 3
Regardless of the ultimate outcome of the hypothetical litiga.tion, Lawyer has become embroiled in controversy that is easily
avoided by declining to represent more than one spouse
separately.
Probably it was this sort of parade of horribles that the
Professional Standards Committee hoped to avoid in originally
proposing a standard that disfavored, but did not completely
prohibit, separate simultaneous representation. It may be true
that for every couple like Diane and Charles, several other
177.
178.

See generally MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 52, § 11.5.
See generally id. § 8.8

179. "The most common form of a legal malpractice action is for
negligence." Id. at 425.
180. Compare Deadwyler v. Volkswagen of Am., 134 F.R.D. 128
(W.D.N.C. 1991), aff'd without op., Moore v. Volkswagen of Am., 966 F.2d
1443 (4th Cir. 1992). The court imposed sanctions on attorneys who failed
to communicate, effectively and accurately, settlement offers, stating: "No

type of misbehavior by an attorney is more universally and categorically
condemned, and is therefore more inherently in 'bad faith,' than the failure
to communicate offers of settlement." Id. at 140.
181.

See MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 52, § 13.27.

182.

See [Model Standards:

Confidentiality] LAws. MAN. ON PROF.

CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 55:503 (1984).
183. This point is more fully developed infra in notes 186-90 and the

accompanying text.
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couples seek separate simulations representation only to insure
personal privacy and technical expertise concerning the nature
and extent of their estate or their estate plan.' 8 4 Also it may be
true that the plans those clients implement in private may contain gifts that meet or exceed their spouse's expectations.
However, there is a substantial risk that a conflict will develop
that materially impairs the ability of the lawyer to give complete
and competent advice to both clients. By adopting a standard
that permits separate simultaneous representation, ACTEC
essentially condones attempts by lawyers to build a Chinese
Wall within their minds. Many courts question the viability of
such a feat within a firm."8 5 To demand it of an individual lawyer is both unrealistic and dangerous - for the clients and the
lawyer.
Informed consent does not cure all ills. A client and lawyer cannot contract to the lawyer's participation in the frustration of the client's objectives.'8 6 Nor should a client and a
lawyer be able to contract to the withholding of relevant information while the lawyer continues to advise the client.'8 7 To
allow such contracts redefines the essence of the attorney-client
relationship in a way that is inconsistent with the profession's
184. Consider the possibility that unbeknownst to Lawyer two of his
current clients marry and ask Lawyer to assist with their estate planning, but
only if separate simultaneous representation can be undertaken. Both have
been previously married, and have sizable estates. Both volunteer that they
have no expectations of receiving any property from the estate of the other.
As current clients, both repose trust in this particular lawyer. While the prior
representation of both clients individually as well as the absence of any
expectations of inheritance may make the situation sufficiently unique to
allow separate simultaneous representation under the original proposed
standard, it is at least arguable that such representation is prohibited without
additional facts that make Lawyer's services more unique (i.e. Lawyer is the
only lawyer in an isolated town who understands the provisions concerning
generation skipping tax).
185. See [Model Standards: Conflict of Interest] LAws. MAN. ON PROF.
CONDUCT

(ABA/BNA) 51:106 (1984):

It is one thing to build a wall around an incoming lawyer so that his
representation of a client of his former firm is not imputed to the
remainder of the new firm. It is quite another to try and segregate
members within a firm working for different clients with adverse
interests.

186. See

RESTATEMENT GOVERNING LAWYERS,

187.

RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY,

supra note 14, § 202 cmt.

g-

See

supra note 54, § 381(a).
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ethos as reflected
in its traditions'
and the rules of profes89
sional conduct. 1
Separate simultaneous representation supposes the lawyer
merely to be the instrument of achieving the goals of the client,
rather than an independent actor with separate moral accountability for his or her own actions. While the lawyer must
respect the freedom of the client to choose wrongly, that
respect does not include a requirement that clients be assisted
in executing their wrongful purpose.' 90 To require active
assistance by the lawyer would be to require that the lawyer be
corrupted in his or her own struggle to be good.
Under the hypothetical facts that are the subject of this
article, Lawyer must decline to alter the estate plan surreptitiously, but may not create absolute barriers to John's exercise
of freedom. John remains free to obtain the services of another
lawyer in making the changes. It is only when John is unable to
act except through the use of Lawyer's skills, that the lawyer
must choose between the client's need to be free and the lawyer's need to be good.' 9 ' The hypothetical facts do not present
188. The often cited statement of an advocate's duty to the client made
by Lord Brougham in his defense of Queen Caroline against George IV's bill
for divorce:
An advocate, by the sacred duty which he owes his client, knows, in
the discharge of that office, but one person in the world, that client
and none other. To save that client at all expedient means - to
protect that client at all hazards and costs to all others, and among
others to himself - is the highest and most unquestioned of his
duties; and he must not regard the alarm, the suffering, the torment,
the destruction, which he may bring upon any other.
Deborah L. Rhode, An Adversarial Exchange on Adversarial Ethics: Text, Subtext,
and Content, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 29, 29 (1991); see also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW

GOVERNING LAWYERS § 28 cmt. c (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1992). But see id. § 30
cmt. d.
189. The primary task of legal ethics is in answering two questions: 1)
Can a good person be a good lawyer? and 2) if so, how? See Charles Fried,
The Lawyer as Friend: the Moral Foundationsof the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE
L.J. 1060 (1976). The universal answer of lawyers (and law professors to the
extent that we have surrendered our claim to being "real" lawyers) is that it is
possible to be a good person and a good lawyer.
It is the second question that divides those who speak (or write) publicly
on the issue. The division seems to surround the question of whether it is
more important for the good lawyer to help the client be free or be good.
The best illustration of this debate is contained in the responsive essays of
Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal Ethics and the Good Client, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 319
(1987), and Monroe H. Freedman, Legal Ethics and the Suffering Client, 36 CATH.
U. L. REV. 331 (1987).
190. See MODEL RULES, supra note 6, Rules 1.2 and 3.3.

191. While a full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this
article, the author believes that voluntariness (or free will) is a precondition

1993]

AND THE TWO SHALL BECOME AS ONE

such a dilemma, nor is that the dilemma faced in the routine
practice of estate planning. The initial recommendation of the
Standards Committee for the ACPC recognized the rare occurrence of such cases and seemed to endorse the lawyer's obligation to assist the client in exercising his or her freedom.
However, because of the inherent problems in this model of
representation, the committee articulated strict protections
necessary to insure ethical conduct by counsel forced to undertake separate simultaneous representation of spouses.' 9 2
It is not a sufficient answer to these objections that the current Rules compel withdrawal if what is only a potential conflict
at the beginning of representation later ripens into an actual
conflict. The very act of withdrawing may compromise the
secrecy which the client seeking secret assistance wants maintained (regardless of how convincing and innocuous the reasons given to the spouse at risk of being harmed).' 9 3
Additionally, withdrawal does nothing to assist the client who
remains ignorant of relevant information to his or her planning
process. In short, withdrawal satisfies no one, except perhaps
the lawyer who can wash his or her hands, saying as Pontius
Pilate did, "Look to it yourselves."' 9 4
JOINT REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL

Both customary practice and case law support joint representation of spouses by an individual lawyer.' 9 5 The original
standard proposed by the Professional Standards Committee of
the American College of Probate Counsel recognized joint
representation as the norm in professional conduct, and articulated the necessary "disclosures" to ensure that such representation was consistent with the desires of the clients.
In most cases, an ACPC [American College of Probate Counsel] Fellow appropriately may represent both
to moral goodness. Absent an ability to change the will, John's maintaining
the original content of his will has no intrinsic moral character of the type we
define as "good" or "evil."
192. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
193. While Rule 1.16 permits withdrawal "if a client insists upon
pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent," it
is permissible only if withdrawal does not have a "material adverse effect" on
the client.
194. Matthew 27:24 (New American Bible).
195. See Forbush v. Forbush, 485 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1985) ("family
attorney" for husband and wife who had amongst other services drafted their
wills was precluded from representing husband separately in divorce action
against wife); Le Van, supra note 81, at 20; see also Committee Report, supra note

19, at 10.
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husband and wife with respect to estate planning. If the
husband and wife are the "common" or "joint" clients of
the Fellow, the most important consequence is that the
confidences of the clients, although confidential as to
others, will not be confidential as between themselves.
An ACPC Fellow should attempt to resolve any conflicts
that arise between husband and wife clients in a manner
consistent with the applicable rules of professional
conduct.
Before undertaking to represent both a husband and
wife with respect to estate planning, an ACPC Fellow
shall, preferably in writing,
(A) inform them of the absence of confidentiality as
between them insofar as the object of the representation is concerned; and
(B) obtain their consent to the disclosure of one of
them of relevant information communicated to
the Fellow by the other of them.' 9 6
While controversy surrounded the disapproval of the practice of separate simultaneous representation, 197 criticism of the
joint representation standard seems to have focused, not upon
the propriety of such representation, but rather upon the need
for a professional standard articulating what is such a common
practice.198

Academic criticism of joint representation for estate planning purposes has focused upon the perceived limitations such
representation poses to the individual client's exercise of testamentary autonomy.' 9 9 Characterizing joint representation as
the "show and tell" approach, Professor Pennell warns that
"this approach discourages each spouse from approaching the
attorney with secrets that might be relevant to the couple's
planning, which means that the attorney will do a less than
complete job of best representing a spouse who has a relevant
20 0
secret."
There are instances where clients have secrets from their
spouses that are relevant to the plan for disposition of their
196. Representation of Husband and Wife, supra note 155, at 199. The
remaining text of the proposed standard contained specific disapproval of
separate representation simultaneously undertaken by a single lawyer, except
in extraordinary circumstances. This aspect of the standard is discussed supra
in notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
197. See Springs, supra note 27, at 21.
198. See The Debate, supra note 158.
199. See Pennell, supra note 20.
200. Id. at 18-29.
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estate, and yet they come to lawyers seeking joint representation with their spouse. However, the stories of lawyers who
have dealt with such clients evidence that such cases are the
exception rather than the rule in their practices.
At the conclusion of a presentation on the subject of this
article, the author was approached by an estate planner who
had been in practice more than twenty years. The lawyer
recounted his experience of meeting with a husband and wife
initially, and agreeing to represent them jointly. During the
initial meeting the lawyer explained the state law requirements
of specific disinheritance of any child that the testator intended
to exclude. The day after the initial meeting the husband
called the lawyer and asked if the pretermitted heir requirement applied to children born in a foreign country. The lawyer
assured the husband that it did, only to have him disclose that
although he had been married for thirty years to his wife, prior
to his marriage he had fathered a child in France during World
War II. His wife did not know this. When the lawyer replied
that it would be necessary to include a recital concerning the
child in order to insure that the child did not take under the
will, the husband responded that he did not mind the inclusion
of such a recital or his wife learning he had another child. He
simply was reluctant to tell her himself; therefore he reasoned
it was the lawyer's obligation to tell her as part of the representation. The lawyer managed to persuade the husband to tell
the wife himself, and ultimately the "unknown son" was introduced into the family and at last report routinely visited his
father annually. 2 ' This sort of reconciliation is exactly what
Professor Shaffer argues is possible when lawyers accept and
are faithful to the trust given in estate planning for the
family.2 °2
The lawyer's story and others similar to it provide at least
anecdotal evidence that even some clients with secrets, who
201. Interview with author (Oct., 1991).
202. Shaffer states:
Collective isolation probably is not good politically, nor is it an
adequate premise for a professional ethic that ignores the realities of
the communities that we, in our communal isolations, have. These
communities are what we present to our lawyers. Lawyers who are
invited into such (to use Brandeis' word) situations are invited into
sacred places. They are all the more sacred to the extent that these
human harmonies somehow survive in a commonwealth of
strangers. The moral principle, if we still need a principle after we
see the reality, is that lawyers should endeavor in such places not to
make things worse.
Shaffer, Legal Ethics, supra note 81, at 983.
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seek joint representation, are better served by the models of
joint representation or representation of the family. These stories must be afforded some weight in assessing the implicit
decision by the client in coming to the lawyer with his or her
spouse. The widespread practice of joint representation may
reflect the reality of many clients and lawyers' concluding that
the accumulation and passage of property are "family" matters
and thus better served by joint representation. Separate representation by separate counsel may reflect a contrary conclusion, that wealth is accumulated individually, and should be
controlled individually. Under the separate representation
model, the continuation of the decedent's lifework through the
passage of property is best promoted by solitary reflection by
the client and separate representation by the lawyer. Under the
joint representation model, the continuation of the decedent's
lifework is seen as merely a continuation of the relationships of
the client through the passage of property.
Professor Pennell asserts that the widespread practice of
joint representation may be "for the protection of the attorney" rather than because it is in the client's best interest.2 °3 He
identifies the protection afforded the attorney through joint
representation as
the attorney escapes being in the middle of a terrible situation and essentially puts the monkey on the back of the
spouse with the secret; if revelation of the secret is
important to adequate representation, presumably the
holder of the secret will go to another attorney, which
takes care of the mutual representation problem in the
right manner: the client decides what is best.20 4
While this is an obvious caricature of the motivation of the
attorneys engaged in joint representation, there is some truth
in it. Joint representation with its corollary duty of disclosure
between spouses does eliminate any conflicting duties that
might arise between the duty to give information and the duty
to maintain confidences. Agreeing to joint representation
establishes a clear hierarchy of duties, which can be realistically
fulfilled by the attorney. Unlike separate simultaneous representation that may require the lawyer to stand silent while one
client relies upon assumptions known to be false by the attorney, joint representation requires both clients have all information given to the attorney. This allows the attorney to give
203.
204.

Pennell, supra note 20, at 18-30.
Id. at 18-29.
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candid advice in accordance with Rule 2.1, and allows the clients more accurately to assess the value of that advice.
The final objection raised to joint representation is the difficulty the attorney experiences in determining when representation ends for purposes of subsequently representing one of
the spouses in unilaterally modifying his or her estate plan created through the joint representation.2 0 5 This problem contains two issues within it: 1) identifying the client, and 2)
defining the scope of representation. Both of these can be
dealt with at the outset of representation. Under joint representation, the clients are both spouses. The scope of representation can be limited under the current Rules,2 °6 and in this
instance should be clearly established with the clients - representation jointly only as to estate planning matters. If representation pertaining to other matters is undertaken, it should
be undertaken by separate agreement, maintaining a clear line
between those matters that are joint and those matters that are
individual to each client.
The historical experience of the practicing bar suggests
that joint representation is both proper and realistic for clients
approaching the lawyer together in order to obtain assistance
with estate planning. Efforts to discourage such representation
seem premised upon a view of marriage that is not the reality
most clients are experiencing when they ask for joint representation. The attorney engaged in joint representation is
required to do no more and no less than attorneys engaged in
separate representation of only one spouse - gather all relevant information, counsel the clients concerning the legal
requirements to accomplish their objectives, and assist them in
implementing whatever plan they ultimately choose.
CONCLUSION

In many ways the life of the lawyer (and the life of the law)
would be simpler if individuals were truly solitary in all matters
that concern them deeply. Law could be based almost exclusively upon principles of autonomy and consent. Lawyers
could serve, with undivided loyalty, every client asking for representation, but neither clients nor lawyers are solitary. And
nowhere is that more readily apparent than in the representation of a married couple for estate planning purposes.
When couples seeking representation present themselves
to the lawyer as a family or a couple, they are affirming their
205.
206.

Id.
MODEL RULES,

supra note 6, Rule 1.2
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implicit conclusion that the interests of the husband and the
wife are shared interests. Whether consciously or unconsciously they are representing to the lawyer that their common
desires are greater than whatever individual desires or tensions
and cross purposes may exist. Lawyers should be allowed to
affirm this vision of unity through offering joint or family
representation.
When individuals, who are married, seek representation
alone they are implicitly communicating their conclusions that
individual desires determine their course of action, or that the
tensions and cross purposes within their marital relationship
outweigh the common desires. Lawyers should be allowed to
affirm these conclusions by offering separate representation to
the individual seeking assistance.
The models of lawyer for the family, joint representation,
and separate representation by separate lawyers accommodate
all possible relationships that can exist between spouses seeking to become clients for estate planning purposes. Adopting a
professional standard that encompasses these three models
recognizes that only the couple can weigh their shared desires
against individual desires or tensions and cross purposes within
the relationship. The addition of separate simultaneous representation as a legitimate model of representation adds nothing
to this recognition.
Instead the model of separate simultaneous representation
concerns itself with defining the nature of the relationship of
the clients with the lawyer. The traditions and laws governing
the profession have always reserved the power to define an
attorney-client relationship to the profession and the courts. Lawyers may not represent both sides of a matter in litigation,.. 7
although many clients might consent to such representation, 0 8
because the profession recognizes that such representation has
ramifications beyond the particular resolution of the particular
claims by the particular clients.2 0 9 Separate simultaneous rep207. Id. Rule 1.7.
208. See, e.g., Klem v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509 (Ct. App.
1977) (A single attorney represented husband and wife in a divorce
proceeding to confirm child-support agreement. The Court found the
primary representation to be negotiating a property settlement, although one
step involved a judicial proceeding. The parties may not waive conflict in
contested litigations, but they may do so in an uncontested dissolution.).
209. See RESTATEMENT GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 14, § 209 cmt c.
"Although a single lawyer may sometimes represent both husband and wife
in negotiating a property settlement prior to marital dissolution (see § 211,
cmt. d), a single lawyer may not do so when the matter comes before a
tribunal, even when the issues are uncontested." Id.
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resentation has ramifications beyond the particular representation of the particular individuals who are married.
The worst possible scenario is where the lawyer has relevant (but confidential) information that the client does not have
and the lawyer facilitates actions by the client that would not be
undertaken but for the client's ignorance. Permitting separate
simultaneous representation excuses the disloyalty inherent in
the lawyer's actions in this case on the basis that the client consented. This excuse is invalid for two reasons: 1) the client's
ignorance evidences an absence of "informed" consent to the
withholding of information, which is a necessary predicate to
separate simultaneous representation; and 2) independent of
the existence or non-existence of consent, such disloyalty is
antithetical to the attorney-client relationship. While some acts
of "disloyalty" are the necessary result of lawyers having obligations beyond serving the individual client, 21 0 the acts of disloyalty in the context of estate planning are neither
unforeseeable nor inherent in our system of private counsel.
In the worst case scenario, the disloyalty arises because the lawyer undertook the impossible - the faithful serving of two clients whose lives were intertwined by marriage, but whose goals
were separate and distinct. No lawyer can serve two masters,
for the lawyer will either love the first (preserving the client's
confidences), and hate the second (betraying the other client's
trust), or hate the first (disclosing the client's confidences), and
love the second (protecting the other client's ability to make
informed decisions). 2 1 1 This inherent conflict compels the
rejection of separate simultaneous representation as a professional norm. As reflected by the initial recommendation of the
Professional Standards Committee of the American College of
Probate Counsel, this model of representation should be permitted only on the rare occasions when exceptional circumstances require the heroic effort of building and maintaining a
Chinese Wall within the lawyer's mind.
210. See, e.g., Pieron v. Missouri, 793 S.W.2d 618 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)
(Movant claimed attorney had breached his duty of confidentiality and that
attorney's performance was deficient due to failure to call particular
witnesses. Court found that attorney was "on the horns of an ethical
dilemma" when it became apparent that movant wanted witnesses called who
the attorney believed would perjure themselves. Attorney found to have
done more than an adequate job of dealing with "a difficult, manipulative
client" by exercising his judgment in eliminating the distortions by not
calling the witnesses within the scope of Model Rule 3.3.)
211. Cf Brook v. Zebre, 792 P.2d 196, 200 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting Luke
16:13).

